Published: Theory choice, non-epistemic values, and machine learning

In this academic paper, I use a theorem from machine learning to support the claim that we can’t choose between theories without relying on non-epistemic values, such as social and political values.

The paper was published by Synthese, a top philosophy journal. It also won the Fink Prize, for the best paper written by a UC Berkeley philosophy graduate student in 2019.

Here is the free preprint and here is the paywalled official version

This is a summary of the paper:

Can we choose between theories without relying on non-epistemic values, such as social and political values? I use a theorem from machine learning, called the “No Free Lunch” theorem (NFL), to support the claim that we can’t.

First, I argue that NFL entails that predictive accuracy is insufficient to favor a given theory over others. Second, I argue that NFL challenges our ability to give a purely epistemic justification for using other traditional epistemic virtues, such as simplicity or explainability, in theory choice. Third, I argue that the natural way to overcome NFL’s challenge is to use non-epistemic values in theory choice. Last, I argue that, contrary to common conception, the epistemic challenge arising from NFL is distinct from Hume’s problem of induction and other forms of underdetermination.